Bottom line up front
Houthi ballistic missiles have hit Saudi airports and oil sites since 6 October, killing at least twenty people. No Turkish or Pakistani unit has been credited with an interception, and neither has fired a shot. Nobody has supplied new ballistic missile defence, and interceptors are scarce: the 730 PAC-3 MSE rounds cleared for Riyadh, about fourteen months of Lockheed’s 620 global output, arrive from 2027. This puts the Asian Cup on 7 January in doubt, and the wider cost lands on interest rates, currencies and plastics. Attacks on Yanbu, the route around Hormuz, helped lift Brent to 117 dollars, and markets price rate rises from the Bank of England in November and the Fed in December. Oil importers are seriously impacted too, India’s rupee is near its record low and Egypt’s local bonds had the worst week in emerging markets. US chemicals group Dow’s plastics profits have jumped, but investors expect the windfall to end with the war.

One: what is actually being provided
The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan on 7 August, treats an attack on one as an attack on all, but lets each decide its help “within the limits of their available resources”. Invoked on 5 October, it is not in force until all three ratify, on the text leaked to Middle East Eye, and covers attack by “another country or group of countries”, which the Houthis are not.
Pakistan is in on the record, and has not fired a shot. Its military spokesman confirmed on 7 October that Pakistan’s forces “are already there”: roughly 8,000 troops, sixteen JF-17s, two drone squadrons and a Chinese HQ-9 battery. Pakistan has claimed no interception, and Saudi announcements credit none to a Pakistani unit.
On the record, Turkey appears clear in that they will not fight. Defence Minister Guler, 24 October: “We absolutely do not foresee entering into any conflict with the Houthis.” Reuters, quoting a US official describing Turkey’s help, lists drone operators, surveillance, logistics and air defence equipment, sent bilaterally; the US is not part of that package.
Others have sent help, none of it ballistic defence. Britain has flown RAF Typhoons on defensive patrols since 20 October, sent an A400M, and its tankers refuel Saudi jets striking Houthi targets in Yemen. French forces have been at Yanbu since about 13 October. Washington reportedly shares intelligence but has announced nothing new; Rubio said on 20 October “they’d like interceptors ... We would like interceptors.”
Turkey and Pakistan can help against drones, not ballistic missiles, and it is the missiles that kill. Of 894 threats Saudi Arabia intercepted between 3 March and 7 April, 799 were drones and 86 ballistic missiles. Turkey’s Korkut guns and Hisar missiles, reaching 15km and 25km, and Pakistan’s jets and drones can take on the drones. Neither fields a proven ballistic defence: Turkey’s Siper cannot yet stop ballistic missiles, its Russian S-400s need Moscow’s consent to move, and Pakistan’s Chinese HQ-9 is limited.
The ballistic shield, all in place before 6 October, is not enough. Saudi Patriot and THAAD, American Patriots and a Greek Patriot at Yanbu carry it; Korea’s Cheongung II is ordered, not delivered. On 25 October alone the coalition announced eleven intercepts, the Riyadh airport strike got through, and the Wall Street Journal has reported Riyadh low on interceptors. Turkey itself relies on NATO Patriots at Kurecik and Incirlik, which have intercepted Iranian ballistic missiles at least four times.
Two: will they fight? The base rate says no
Across twelve Turkish and Pakistani cases since 1979, neither has fired a shot in anger for a Gulf partner. Turkey put troops into Qatar within thirteen days in 2017, then did nothing when Israel struck Doha in 2025. In 2015 Pakistan’s parliament voted for neutrality on Yemen whilst pledging to defend the holy sites, which is the template now.
The fighting is Saudi. Saudi aircraft and Yemeni government forces are fighting the Houthis, with British tankers in support. Turkey could add armed drones, F-16s and electronic warfare, Pakistan its jets and drones in country. Pressure to use them is rising: the Houthis have threatened Turkey and Pakistan by name (5 October), Aramco (13 October), Egypt (17 October), and Riyadh airport and airlines (24 and 25 October).
Both governments talk in ways that make not fighting easier. Pakistan’s defence minister says “the combat is practically being conducted by Saudi Arabia’s own forces”, and Islamabad called a report of Pakistani strikes in Yemen “fake and fabricated”.
Ankara is slow-walking ratification, to take the credit without a legal duty to fight. The text reached parliament on 20 October, seventy-four days after signature and twelve after ministers promised it “within days”, and its committee meets on 27 October.
So, despite the rhetoric, neither is coming to fight for Riyadh. Bahceli’s “all possible military support” and Islamabad’s “all of Pakistan’s resources” mean presence and defence, not combat.
The judgements, to 31 December. Turkish offensive combat in Yemen: remote, 3 to 7 per cent. Publicly credited Turkish defensive engagement: a realistic possibility, 25 to 35, and 55 to 65 by June if ratified. Acknowledged Pakistani offensive combat: unlikely, 10 to 20; unacknowledged strikes already: 30 to 40. American strikes on the Houthis before 3 November: unlikely, 10 to 20, since Trump said he will act “after the Elections”.
Three: the economic output for Saudi Arabia and the wider world
The real damage is to a strategy. The 2030 target is 30m transit passengers, ten times 2019. A Saudia A320 was badly damaged on the ground, 45 per cent of Saudi departures were cancelled from 8 to 25 October, 19 foreign airlines including Lufthansa and Cathay suspended flights, and Delta delayed its launch to March 2027. Middle East traffic was already down 14.6 per cent in August. Shares in flynas trade 8 per cent below their 5 October price; unlisted Riyadh Air, a single hub with about 130 aircraft on order, is most exposed.
Airlines everywhere pay through fuel. Jet fuel averaged 196.70 dollars a barrel last week against the 152 behind IATA’s 23bn dollar profit forecast for 2026; on our arithmetic, the fourth-quarter overspend alone erases it. European warnings over Gulf, Saudi, Iraqi and Iranian airspace lengthen Europe-Asia routes. Ryanair’s shares are down a quarter this year, Bloomberg reports, and its chief expects fares up to 20 per cent higher in 2027.
The Asian Cup is in danger, and with it the tourism case. It opens on 7 January with 31 of its 51 matches in Riyadh. The AFC is assessing until the end of November and has floated 2028. The target is 150m visits by 2030, against 122m in 2025, but international visitors fell 13 per cent from January to May, so the Kingdom may hit the number on domestic trips and miss the foreign spending.
The fiscal position is worse than forecast, but nobody is betting against the riyal. Q2 non-oil growth was 0.9 per cent against an official projection of 3.2, so the engine of Vision 2030 is running at roughly 28 per cent of plan. Costs bite: Almarai’s profit barely grew in the third quarter on sales up 11 per cent, squeezed by feed shipping, and its shares have slipped. The riyal is fixed at 3.75 to the dollar. On 23 October the one-year forward priced it about half a per cent weaker, a fifth of the 2016 level when markets did bet on a break. Saudi shares fell 9.9 per cent from 5 to 25 October, yet insuring Saudi debt for five years costs only about 70 basis points, pricing slower growth, not a fiscal crisis.
Could lost prosperity bring unrest? History says not quickly. In 2011 Riyadh met the Arab Spring with about 130bn dollars of spending, police in the Eastern Province and a clerical ban on protest, and its “Day of Rage” drew nobody; in 2017 the Ritz-Carlton detentions yielded about 106bn and removed rivals within the family. Our judgement: unrest threatening the regime within a year is unlikely, 10 to 20 per cent, and a challenge from within the family remote, under 10, rising if public pay is cut and stays cut.
The war encourages an inward turn that began before it. Saudi Arabia sent about 123bn dollars of direct investment abroad in 2021-2025 (UNCTAD), but newly announced projects abroad fell from 33bn in 2022 to 12bn in 2025. In mid-April the PIF approved a 2026-2030 strategy built on domestic sectors, then ended LIV Golf’s funding.
Four: the region and the world
There is no intra-Gulf substitution trade. Dubai lost 31.3 per cent of its traffic in the first half of 2026 because Gulf aviation is one airspace, and Qatar, holder of the American guarantee Riyadh was refused, is the worst GCC equity market this year.
Beyond crude, the largest effect is on interest rates, because the Houthis now hit the route around Hormuz. Brent settled at 116.72 dollars on 23 October, as attacks on Yanbu and other oil sites revived fears of a squeeze. Markets price about a 95 per cent chance of a Bank of England rise on 5 November and 70 to 90 per cent for a Fed rise in December, with ten-year gilts above 5.4 per cent. Gold fell below 4,000 dollars in its worst week for four months, because the war reaches it through oil and yields. The futures curve still treats the shock as temporary, with Brent for December 2027 about 26 dollars below this December.
Oil importers pay; plastics makers outside the Gulf profit, for now. India’s rupee came within 0.2 per cent of its record low this month despite the Reserve Bank’s first rate rise in almost four years, and Egypt’s local-currency government bonds lost 3.09 per cent in the week to 24 October, the worst in emerging markets, on a falling pound. The Middle East supplied over 40 per cent of world polyethylene exports in 2025, and Dow lifted prices 14 per cent and operating profit by 707m dollars in the third quarter whilst its Asian volumes fell, yet its shares are back at pre-war levels, on doubt the premium outlasts the war.
Saudi money abroad is turning political. The UAE supplies 75 per cent of GCC greenfield investment abroad, so Gulf money becomes Abu Dhabi money. Sport loses its top buyer, strengthening the PGA Tour against LIV and leaving EA, about 93 per cent PIF-owned with about 20bn dollars of debt, a cash asset. Egypt’s 5.3bn Saudi deposit fell due this month, unrolled so far, as its parliament votes on sending air defence forces, and Pakistan’s rollovers fall due in December and March, so both countries’ bonds track standing in Riyadh. Remittances are unhurt, Pakistan’s from Saudi Arabia up about 20 per cent in September, but Saudi residents borrowed 27bn dollars abroad in the first quarter, crowding weaker emerging borrowers, and last week emerging high yield fell whilst investment grade rose.
Five: the trade
Saudi risk is priced in marine war risk at Yanbu, roughly 3 per cent of hull value against 0.2 to 0.3 without a Saudi nexus, and in a Tadawul at a five-year low. Saudi dollar bonds are down almost 19 per cent since the Iran war began, yet a Gulf spread of 88 basis points prices little lasting damage. Asian refiners paid around twenty dollars over benchmark for at least 12m barrels delivered from outside Hormuz, a supply risk invisible in the flat price.
What is not priced is the equity. Aramco fell 1.6 per cent the day after its headquarters was hit, and the US aerospace and defence ETF fell 0.3 per cent as Saudi airports were hit. That is rational: interceptor output is fixed to 2030, so an extra customer reorders the queue rather than raising 2027 revenue. A Pentagon framework triples output by 2030 and Boeing won a 14.7bn dollar seeker contract: the constraint is now physics, not capital.
So the position is interceptors and seekers outside the American queue. Korea holds the Saudi ballistic-capable contract, LIG Nex1’s 3.2bn dollars for ten Cheongung II batteries, but on 20 October Seoul barred the company, now LIG D&A, from Korean public tenders for two years over bribery, and its shares fell 9 per cent. On Turkey, do not buy the equity. Aselsan trades near thirty times trailing EV/EBITDA against European peers at roughly 13 to 20, in a lira losing 15 per cent a year, and almost none of its order book is attributably Saudi. Take the exposure through a European prime; BAE Systems drew 9.3 per cent of 2025 sales from Saudi Arabia. Pakistan is a balance sheet story: up to 8bn dollars of Saudi deposits, 5bn of it confirmed, against 2024 arms exports of about 22m. The deployment is collateral. It will be interesting to see how the rumoured lo-cost Ukrainian cruise missiles may be able to assist.
Why Riyadh bought this alliance
In September 2025 Washington signed an executive order treating an armed attack on Qatar as a threat to its own peace and security. Riyadh sought the same sentence, per the Financial Times, and in November got a Strategic Defense Agreement, major non-NATO ally status and the F-35s without it. In mid-September the Houthis promised American officials in Muscat to spare American, Israeli and commercial ships, but not Saudi ones; Trump said there is “just one country that they’re not too happy with”. Riyadh was refused a commitment and is buying substitutes.
Clearly, there is much for Governments to think about around the world…

