Bottom line up front
On 29 October the European Commission reopened SAFE, its €150bn defence loan instrument, offering member states the €21.3bn that round one left unclaimed. The reality is that the position for overseas defence companies has not changed. If you are not in Europe you have significant restrictions that only a joint venture or minority position will resolve.
Whilst there was much talk of the UK securing a SAFE agreement, Britain cannot borrow from the fund. Almost a year after talks collapsed over the entry fee, the UK still has no agreement, which caps British-made content at 35% of the component cost of anything SAFE pays for, or entering into a 49:51 JV with a European company. The rules bite on where a product is made and who controls the supplier, so a well-advised UK, US or Korean company can structure much of its way back in. The more important decision for London concerns the far larger EU defence budget from 2028.
But, there are ways for UK companies to navigate round this.

What the new round is
The €21.3bn is in reality not new but recycled money, left over mainly because Hungary and Italy decided to borrow less than planned, with Italy cutting its request to €8.9bn. These funds will be open to member states to name their amounts by 13 November and finalise plans by the end of the year, with the Commission guiding that it wants much of it spent jointly with Ukraine.
Round one showed 99.5% of Poland’s SAFE orders went to Polish industry, and Rheinmetall’s €5.7bn Romanian order carries a promise that more than half of production will be local. France was not so lucky, it lost circa €1.1bn of its request when projects involving the UK failed the eligibility rules. On our own estimate, armoured vehicles and artillery take about half the value of the contracts named so far.
Why the UK is the rank outsider
Talks failed on 28 November 2025, with Bloomberg reporting that the Commission sought up to €6.75bn, later cut to €2bn according to the FT, whilst Canada paid roughly €10m. Canada’s agreement shows the difference lies in timing as much as size, a €10m entry payment followed by 15% of the value of Canadian content in the contracts its firms win.
In July 2026 the UK joined the EU’s €90bn Ukraine Support Loan on terms that tie its contribution to contracts won by British industry, which is in substance the Canadian formula. If London will pay by results for one EU defence fund, the case for refusing the same terms for SAFE looks considerably weaker.
The September 2025 negotiating mandate still stands and talks can resume at any time, but we have found no British move on round two. Previews of the EU-UK summit in Brussels on 20 November point to student fees rather than defence, so the best realistic outcome is a commitment to reopen talks on a pay-as-you-win fee. A deal would probably not be concluded before 2027, and France and the size of any fee remain the key obstacles, especially with a complicated French domestic situation.
Britain has been in this position with Brussels twice before. In 2018 it left Galileo over access to the encrypted signal, put £92m into studying a national alternative and shelved it within two years. With Horizon Europe it stayed out for two and a half years before rejoining in 2023 at about €2.6bn a year with Copernicus. Price disputes tend to settle once the cost of exclusion becomes visible, but the years outside are not recovered.
Routes in for overseas companies
Building inside under European control is the cleanest route, because contractors must be established and managed in the EU, the EEA or Ukraine and not controlled from elsewhere. Rheinmetall and Lockheed Martin have discussed a 60/40 missile venture in Germany aiming at European-held IP, subject to Washington’s permission. Licensed production is weaker, since COMLOG’s Patriot plant at Schrobenhausen builds under a Raytheon licence with the design in American hands, in a category where SAFE requires European design control.
Owning an EU subsidiary works with conditions, since a foreign-controlled EU company may take part if it has passed investment screening or gives guarantees verified by its host state, and is walled off from classified information. BAE Systems Hägglunds in Sweden, Hanwha’s K9 plant in Romania and Hanwha’s 51%-owned missile venture with WB Group in Poland sit here.
Supplying the 35% is open to anyone, provided third-country components do not exceed the European share, although Poland’s figures suggest the share actually left to outsiders is far smaller.
Building with Ukraine may prove the most interesting route, because Ukraine sits inside the perimeter and is where the Commission wants round two spent. In August the government cleared MBDA to release data on British Storm Shadow components so that France and Ukraine can assemble the missile there. Whether such output counts as Ukrainian origin under SAFE has not, as far as I can establish, been tested.
Partnering through Canada or Norway completes the list, as Canadian content may exceed 35% provided at least 20% is European or Ukrainian, and Norwegian firms such as Kongsberg and Nammo are inside as EEA members. Seoul has no deal, whilst Greece and Cyprus continue to block Turkey.
So what for business
On our own rough estimate, staying outside costs UK industry about €8bn of revenue to 2034, and the 35% allowance is a ceiling buyers rarely approach, since Poland left roughly €0.14bn for foreign suppliers. US and Korean firms enter as minority partners or build locally at their own cost, as Hanwha has in Romania, targeting up to 80% local content. Capital has not yet left Britain, which won the most new European defence plants, 34 of 197. Brussels has no will to soften the fee, the cap or design authority, but Germany, eleven other member states and Parliament’s negotiators want allies admitted to the 2028 money through paid agreements, leaving the price of a British deal to settle.
What could change this
The strongest case for staying out is that the 35% route exists, the pot is small and paying billions for marginal access would be poor value, an argument that probably holds for this round. It may not hold for the 2028-2034 budget, where a defence and space window the Commission proposed at €131bn and member states have pared to about €114bn appears likely to carry similar European preference rules. Watch the 20 November summit, any agreement with Seoul and the final size of that window.


