Understanding the Mecca Pact
The Mecca Pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan is not materially striking in its own right, but what is striking is the lack of accurate commentary and the undervalued investment opportunity in Turkey as a defence market.
The pact is a clear indicator of shifts in Middle East policy and defence stance, with implications for the US, NATO, and the EU. But the agreement is not a ‘Middle East NATO’ and individuals should not get too carried away with comparators to NATO’s Article 5. The Mecca Pact commits nobody to anything, with only four paragraphs, three of them protocol. The operative clause says how an attack shall be regarded but specifies no response. Will it mean that the three parties will fight for each other? Almost certainly not, but it does potentially signal a protection and reinforcement of the Saudi regime.
For those who have covered the Middle East for a number of years, the more interesting point is the growing role that Turkey is now playing in positioning itself as a key gateway between Europe and the Middle East, and the declining role of the US as the regional protector. A role that may be driven by the current desires of the US administration, but will likely have far reaching consequences for American influence, access to regional resources and capital, and drive a much more even negotiating position than in the previous decades.
What was the agreement?
On the 7th August, at Al-Safa Palace in Mecca, the leaders of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. Within moments, people were tweeting that it was the Sunni NATO and the moment when the US dominance of politics and defence within the region stopped. But is this true?
The part of the joint statement that has got people animated is “The Agreement is intended to strengthen collective deterrence against any act of aggression, and stipulates that any armed attack against any one of the three States shall be regarded as an attack against them all. It further provides for the enhancement of all aspects of defence cooperation among the three States.” However, there is no commitment to action unlike NATO Article 5.
Is this really new and will it make a difference?
The Mecca Pact is a development from the Baghdad Pact, the immediate predecessor, which contained no attack-on-one clause at all. CENTO, as it became known, acquired a secretariat, a permanent council and a combined planning staff, and never fired a shot in twenty-four years. Pakistan invoked it twice and was refused both times. Four weeks before the December 1971 war, American National Security Council staff called the commitments, in writing, “practically speaking, dead letters”. What separated NATO from CENTO was a supreme commander, forward-stationed troops and a council in permanent session. By that measure Mecca is thinner than the pact that failed, though it clears one bar CENTO never did in that Pakistani forces are already on Saudi soil, at King Abdulaziz Air Base since April, paid for by Riyadh.
So will it make a difference? Unlikely…
Saudi Arabia already had a mutual-defence commitment with the five other Gulf states, since 2000, and a bilateral pact with Pakistan, since September 2025. The Gulf Cooperation Council’s Peninsula Shield force has deployed successfully once in forty years. Not in 1990, when Kuwait was invaded, but in March 2011, to help suppress Bahrain’s own citizens. Even with the forces already stationed in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan has done little to prevent the Iran attacks in recent months. It shows a pretty damning picture of the prospects for real change.
Could it drag NATO or Europe into war?
If Turkish troops were overseas, no, Article 6 defines the areas where Article 5 (the famous an attack against one is an attack against all clause) is applicable. Turkey has also invoked Article 4 (which obliges consultation) five out of the nine times it has been invoked, none of these have led to NATO action. Article 5 has only ever been used once in the 77 year history, the attack on 9/11. It is clear that NATO would not follow Turkey into a conflict as they would not present as a victim, it would also not be likely that US arms in Turkey could be exported to Pakistan or other locations governed by US AECA and ITAR regulations (Saudi Arabia may be more favourable in US eyes).
On the European front, whilst becoming a major partner for European defence companies, Turkey lacks a security and defence partnership with the EU.
So why have the Mecca Pact at all?
It shows partnership, diplomatic ties, sabre rattles, but does little else in real terms. What it does do however is leave a Pakistani garrison at King Abdulaziz, whilst it may not be authorised to attack countries, it is certainly able to protect the ruling family and defend the current Saudi Arabian way of life, a praetorian contract with a treaty wrapped round it by a nuclear power.
It is certainly not a trade pact, if you look at the numbers. Pakistan has a military budget of circa $10.8bn, but this appears to be mainly focussed on China, and whilst Saudi Arabia is clearly a better global defence purchaser its major suppliers remain the US, UK, France and Spain. Whilst Turkish firms like TAI, Roketsan, and MKE’s have grown significantly, it does not appear to be from the Mecca Pact participants. One continued problem is of course the sanctions placed on Turkey after it traded with Russia on air defence missiles. Although President Trump has committed to removing them, it is yet to happen and whilst these are in place it places a tension between the low cost of production and high export cost.
Is there anything to pique the interest?
The rise of Turkey in defence terms should be of interest to investors. Those who have spent time talking with defence primes will have heard the proselytising about Poland, but also talk of Turkey and the interest in the Turkish market. In part due to a significantly rising defence budget (2026 estimate of $47.6bn according to NATO figures, +25.9% in real terms), the second largest ground force in NATO, increased Turkish exports, but also due to the attractive location for production especially for western primes looking to export to the Middle East. Whilst there is legitimate concern about outsourcing of defence, energy and wages are significantly lower than most other European locations, and certainly less than France, the UK and Germany indicating a lower cost of production.
But, it is not just about the baseline cost. In a market where there is peak demand, production is key and the West have none to spare. All markets are running red hot, and with the prioritisation of domestic supply western suppliers need alternative locations to produce export goods and maintain a direct military sales market when the Western coffers run dry, we must remember defence is cyclical…
So whilst the Mecca Pact may not provide much new news in real terms, from an investment perspective it highlights the role Turkey is playing in European defence. Politically complicated, with difficult relations with Europe at times, Turkey is not for the faint hearted, but as a gateway to the Middle East and a potentially declining US monopolistic position, it is almost certainly set for greater investment and financial rewards. The interesting indicators will be a security and defence partnership with the EU and increased Western prime investment. If you are looking to invest in defence and growth markets, Turkey is a key location to be considering in the global portfolio.